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Introduction: The Myth of Liberation
On March 12, 2004, almost exactly a year after the formal beginning of the U.S. war on
Iraq and during International Women’s Week, George W. Bush gave a speech championing the
so-called “liberation” of 25 million Iraqi and Afghani women. He emphasized the importance of
promoting democracy in the Middle East so that women may be able to “take their rightful place
in societies that were once incredibly oppressive and closed.”1 That a foreign invasion resulting
in two of the longest wars in U.S. history qualifies as “liberation” for women is obviously
questionable, and that the U.S. project in the war on terror was driven by a desire to promote
“democracy” should be suspect to anyone who has seen photographs of Abu Ghraib. Moreover,
feminist scholar Chandra Mohanty has argued that universal claims about the oppression of
Third World women serve to write those women “outside history.”2 In this essay I focus on the
conditions for women in pre-invasion Iraq in an attempt to historicize the specific relationships
of women to the state, the family, and other institutions shaping their lived realities. I seek to
both portray the diversity of Iraqi women’s experiences and to emphasize their agency, rather
than situating them as passive victims of the Iraqi regime, U.S. imperialism, or international
policy. Refuting Bush’s ahistorical conception of Iraq as an “oppressive and closed” society for
women, I examine the complex reality for Iraqi women under the United Nations policy of
comprehensive economic sanctions, enforced on Iraq largely due to U.S. pressure, from 19902003.
The sanctions on Iraq were broad reaching and were strengthened in 1991. The effect of
these sanctions was compounded by the fact that U.S. invading forces during the Gulf War of
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1990-1991 had bombed sanitation and water facilities across the country. This created a terrible
public health crisis because the sanctions’ economic effect made it impossible to rebuild these
facilities. Sanctions killed thousands of Iraqis and caused widespread poverty and malnutrition.
Particularly devastating were the statistics on child mortality; in 1996 it was reported that half a
million Iraqi children had died as a result of sanctions policy. Though this number was later
estimated to be closer to 350,000 from 1990-2000, this impact was still tragic and deeply
harmful. The under-5 mortality rate rose from 56 per 1000 births to 131 per 1000 births during
the sanctions era.3 Beyond just the death toll, sanctions devastated the Iraqi economy and day to
day life of almost all Iraqis.
The pre-sanctions relationship of the Iraqi state to women was complex. Prior to the
imposition of sanctions and under the Ba‘thi government a number of legislative changes
transitioned women from a private to a public social and economic role and limited the control of
male family members over women, but these laws also increased the patriarchal control of the
state itself over women.4 The Ba‘th also created a violent security state that tortured and
executed anyone suspected of opposing the regime (particularly communist opposition) and in no
way discriminated between men and women. However, when we discuss the conditions of Iraqi
women in the pre-invasion era, a nuanced analysis requires far more than blaming the Iraqi state.
It is necessary to analyze the sanctions era to understand the changes in both legal and social
dynamics for Iraqi women in the decade before the U.S. invasion of 2003.
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This essay analyzes the broad ranging impacts of international sanctions on Iraqi women
and gender relations. In this study, the changes in women’s positions will be analyzed across the
following categories: education, employment, family relations, marriage, violence against
women, and political participation. These categories of change are explored with the
understanding that the experiences of Iraqi women under sanctions varied massively based on a
variety of class, ethnic, and religious considerations. By analyzing sanctions primarily through
the lens of gender analysis, with attention to other compounding factors in the understanding of
women’s oppression, I make two arguments. Firstly, I argue that the comprehensive economic
sanctions imposed on Iraq should not be viewed as a nonviolent alternative to war, but rather as a
deeply violent act that continuously harmed the country’s most marginalized populations, in this
case women. Secondly, I argue that these sanctions effectively undermined the movement for
Iraqi women’s liberation not only by creating a more immediate economic concern to divert
public attention from women’s oppression, but by actively reversing the general social transition
towards gender equity since 1968.

Literature Review: A Gender Critique of Sanctions in Development
A gender analysis of the sanctions on Iraq is a critical addition to the new and developing
scholarship on sanctions and should be understood within the imperialist relationship of the
United States to Iraq. Scholarly works on sanctions and on gender in Iraq have had very little
overlap. Though there exists a great deal of work on the harmful effects of sanctions, these works
typically focus more broadly and lack gender analysis. Conversely, the feminist and genderfocused writing on Iraq and imperial violence tends to focus on the impacts of war and not on the
sanctions era. Though there is a growing body of work on the experience of Iraqi women during
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the 2003 Iraq war, and even a sizeable amount of scholarship on the experience of being a
woman soldier during the Iraq war, there is notably almost no scholarship specifically on the
gendered experience of sanctions in Iraq. Research on the violence of sanctions on marginalized
populations beyond Iraq is also expanding, but the work that does exist has potential to inform
our understanding of Iraqi sanctions. The most important works on which this paper draws are
case studies and oral histories that highlight the specificities of Iraqi women’s experiences under
sanctions through their own voices. These sources are critical to developing a feminist
understanding of sanctions.
There are three primary scholars doing deep work to develop a gendered impact of
sanctions in Iraq. In general, research on Iraq is highly limited because of the dangerous
conditions in the country and the destruction of so many archives since the 2003 invasion. As
such, much of the secondary analysis I have been able to draw on is from one author, Nadje alAli, and her sometimes co-author, Nicola Pratt. Al-Ali’s 2007 book Iraqi Women: Untold Stories
from 1948 to the Present focuses on the period between British colonialism in Iraq and the U.S.
occupation, arguing that the experience of women in the post-invasion era cannot be understood
without the vast historical context of developing gender relations. Her study is conducted
through personal narratives and oral histories of women who experienced the changes in Iraq
firsthand. Chapter five, “Living With War and Sanctions,” focuses on the experience of women
during the sanctions, and argues that the sanctions not only had specific, gendered effects, but
that “women and gender ideologies and relations were … at the centre of social and cultural
change during this period.”5 This analysis is brief and could certainly be further developed.
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Al-Ali has also written several articles in relation to this topic, two of which are
additional sources for this paper. “Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi Women Between Dictatorship,
War, Sanctions, and Occupation,” written in 2008, discusses the development of gender relations
and the discourse on women in the Iraqi nation-building process under Saddam Hussein. Her
primary focus is the long-term trajectory of gender relations in Iraqi politics and society. This
piece provides important historical context and focuses more specifically on the Iraqi state’s
relationship to women as part of the nation. Though it provides less focus on sanctions directly, it
helps illuminate the development of state rhetoric and action with regard to women’s rights and
thus the effect of sanctions on state policy.
Al-Ali and Pratt’s 2009 book What Kind of Liberation?: Women and the Occupation of
Iraq, and their 2011 article “Conspiracy of Near Silence: Violence Against Iraqi Women,”
though excellent contributions to scholarship, focus on post-invasion Iraq, dealing less directly
with the experience of women under sanctions, and so are not as relevant to this study. What
they add is important perspective on the experience of Iraqi Kurdish women under sanctions, and
the specificities of Kurdish governance and standing in the eyes of the international community,
imperialist powers, and Iraqi government that contribute to violence against women. Al-Ali’s
work has built a multifaceted gender analysis of sanctions that is situated in Iraqi and Ba‘thi
history, but that also carries forward the impacts of sanctions on women to paint a more complex
picture of the particular struggles of women in post-invasion Iraq.
The other major scholarship on gender and sanctions in Iraq that must be discussed, and
in fact the only full-length book on the topic, is the 2008 book Women in Iraq: The Gender
Impacts of International Sanctions, by Yasmin Al-Jawaheri. Al-Jawaheri’s work is a vast study
that combines statistical analysis with a comprehensive process of survey, interview, and case
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studies of women from various class, family, and educational backgrounds in Baghdad. Through
this work, Al-Jawaheri argues that, despite the fact that Iraqi laws regarding women’s rights
stayed relatively static during the sanctions era, the sanctions contributed to a reversal of the
social gains for women, in large part due to the state’s failure to enforce the laws guaranteeing
women’s participation in education and the work force.6 Though this work is perhaps the most
comprehensive analysis of women’s rights under sanctions, its geographic scope is limited to
Baghdad, likely as a result of the difficulty of conducting research across Iraq. Not only does it
lack a perspective on the experience of rural women and women in other regions, but it is
missing any analysis on the experience of women in Iraqi Kurdistan, a semi-autonomous region
with its own unique history under sanctions that is critical to understanding the broader
experience of “Iraqi women.”
Though the research specifically directed towards Iraq is limited, it is critical to situate
the experience of Iraqi women in the international context. A. Cooper Drury and Dursun Peksen
have written a cross-national study of the gendered effects of coercive economic sanctions which
concludes that “sanctions are detrimental to women’s rights” because sanctions reduce respect
for women’s rights, as quantified in the study.7 They analyze respect with regard to women’s
economic, social, and political status. The authors suggest that the unintended consequences of
policy can be best understood by looking at the policy’s effect on the country’s most vulnerable
groups.8 This study is a broad analysis of sanctions’ effect on women; my research complements
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this broad study by proposing specific ways in which women experience this loss of status in the
context of sanctions on Iraq.
Other cross-national studies of sanctions with a focus on human rights and other
marginalized populations also inform this study. Research by Peksen on the human rights
consequences of sanctions and by Zhike Lv and Ting Zu on ethnic violence increases as a result
of sanctions provide two important insights. Firstly, these studies illustrate that the experience of
women under sanctions is not unique but rather part of the broader violence of sanctions against
marginalized populations. Secondly, they are critical for understanding the intersecting
experiences of women and sanctions; the Lv and Zu study is particularly important for
understanding the multiple violences experienced by Kurdish, Assyrian, and other ethnic
minority women.
Ultimately, this field of scholarship is continually expanding, though the existing work in
the field has been strong. This paper agrees with much of the work by Al-Ali, Pratt, and AlJawaheri, but also aims to situate the conversation about the gendered impacts of sanctions in
Iraq in a broader conversation about the catastrophic violence of the sanctions on Iraq, and the
critique of international sanctions as a form of economic violence, as opposed to a non-violent
alternative to war.

Sanctioning Iraq: A History of Violence
In their recent article, “Violence on Iraqi Bodies: Decolonising Economic Sanctions in
Security Studies,” Mariam Georgis and Riva Gewarges, two Iraqi Assyrian women who survived
sanctions while living in Baghdad, argue that understanding the violence of sanctions
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necessitates decentering the state and focusing on the experience of the Iraqi people.9 By
portraying Saddam Hussein as a security threat to U.S. civilians, the consequences of sanctions
become justified; it is only by othering Iraqi bodies that the violence of sanctions can be written
off as a price worth paying.10 Crucially, they also view the imposition of sanctions as an
extension of colonial violence on the Global South. This article goes hand-in-hand with recent
transnational data-analyses on sanctions in relation to human rights; research shows that
sanctions, particularly comprehensive sanctions rather than partial sanctions, worsens human
rights abuses related to “physical integrity,” defined as freedom from extralegal killing, torture,
disappearance, etc., ethnic violence, and respect for women’s rights.11 Georgis and Gewarges’s
framework for understanding sanctions is an important part of the process of rehumanizing Iraqis
in the discussion of sanctions, a precursor to understanding the gender violence of sanctions.
Here I will present a brief overview of the sanctions program and the structural flaws that
contributed to its violence.
The sanctions against Iraq began in August of 1990 and continued until May 22, 2003,
after Saddam Hussein had been overthrown by the U.S. invading forces. Initially, the sanctions
were put in place with the goal of forcing Iraq out of Kuwait, though this goal was quickly
achieved by the use of military force during the first Gulf War. The sanctions, however, were not
lifted. Instead, they were reframed with the goal of forcing the Iraqi government’s compliance
with ongoing UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections to ensure that the government
was not harboring chemical weapons in the wake of the Anfal genocide, a series of attacks on
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Iraqi Kurdistan from 1986-1989 which killed up to 182,000 Iraqi Kurds and several thousand
Assyrians. However, many researchers, political activists, and government officials have
acknowledged that the U.S. approach towards sanctions was focused on the end of the Saddam
Hussein regime rather than the weapons inspections. At least at the beginning of sanctions, the
idea that the sanctions would remain as long as Saddam was in power was openly discussed. 12
But even after it became clear that Saddam would not quickly give up his power, U.S. officials
maintained the importance of Saddam’s downfall as a precursor to lifting sanctions, despite the
severe impacts of sanctions on the Iraqi population. Estimates of child mortality rates initially
suggested that more than half a million Iraqi children were killed by sanctions by 1996.
Recently, more conservative estimates have suggested that this number is closer to 350,000 from
1990-2000, but the under-five mortality rate did increase from 56 per 1000 births to 131 per
1000 births under sanctions.13 In general, access to health and food resources in Iraq were fatally
low for much of the population. By the mid-1990s, it was no longer possible to ignore the deadly
impacts of sanctions on the Iraqi population. In 1995, the UN established the Oil for Food
Program (OFF) in an attempt to mitigate the impacts of sanctions on the Iraqi public. This
program enabled Iraq to sell oil in exchange for food, medicine, and other humanitarian needs.
However, this program was severely limited by corruption and allocation issues. Yasmin AlJawaheri has written that, in part because of their control of OFF implementation, “Saddam
Hussein and his henchmen, over more than thirteen years of sanctions, grew obscenely rich as a
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direct result of sanctions that were meant to punish them.”14 This wealth was also generated
through smuggling of oil and hoarding of what little resources Iraq still had.
A contributing factor to OFF’s failures to mitigate the public health crisis was the
separation of funds between Iraqi Kurdistan and the remaining regions of Iraq. Kurdistan
received a disproportionate share of the funds per capita and the money to pay for OFF’s
beureaucratic operations came only out of the Central and South budget. Purchases for Kurdistan
also had to be prepaid out of the Central and South budget, with exceptionally long
reimbursement periods.15 Though it is true that Kurdistan had been disadvantaged for years
under the Ba‘th regime and that Kurdistan faced particular difficulty with the high number of
internally displaced peoples, Kurdistan also experienced a remarkably high influx of aid and
NGO support. This aid influx was not entirely effective, but the misallocation of resources meant
that OFF did little to stop the humanitarian crisis in South and Central Iraq.
Even if OFF had functioned entirely as intended, it would not have fully compensated for
the economic and humanitarian crisis impacts of sanctions. Dennis Halliday, former UN
Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, alleged that OFF “was never intended to actually resolve the
humanitarian crisis,” but merely served to stop it from worsening.16 He was highly critical of the
bureaucratic processes behind approving OFF purchases, which he saw as highly politicized to
serve the interests of the U.S. and U.K. Hans von Sponeck, who took over Halliday’s position
after he resigned in protest of the sanctions, was also highly critical of the OFF program on many
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fronts, from the inadequacy of the budget to begin rebuilding the devastated water and sanitation
infrastructure, to the failure to designate a specific fund for education.
From the mid-1990s onward, the sanctions continued to be enforced despite the clear
human rights impacts, and the blame for the humanitarian crisis was placed entirely onto the
Iraqi state. Additionally, the U.S. continued to push for sanctions to remain until Saddam was
removed from office. In 1997, Madeleine Albright, the then Secretary of State, said, “We do not
agree with those nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons
of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted,” despite the fact that the sanctions were
specifically imposed to enforce the decommissioning of weapons of mass destruction.17 Hans
von Sponeck said that various officials under both the Clinton and George H.W. Bush
governments made absolutely clear that the sanctions would remain as long as Saddam did, a
policy formalized by Congress in 1998. Von Sponeck argues that this hard line policy made the
Iraqi government less cooperative with the UN.18 Though the regime initially cooperated with
UNSCOM inspections, U.S. policy continued to hold Iraqi people hostage as a bargaining tool
for regime change, a bargain which failed to motivate a dictator to sacrifice his own power.
There were those within both the UN and the U.S. government who felt the long-term
enforcement of these sanctions was inhumane. Questions were raised, even fairly early on in the
sanctions period, about the effectiveness of U.S. enforcement of sanctions against Saddam and
the toll it was taking on the Iraqi people. In 1991, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David
Mack said in an interview that he believed the U.S. government had underestimated both the
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ability of the Iraqi government to survive sanctions economically and “the degree to which the
regime was willing to make its people suffer.”19 Three UN officials also resigned over the
prolonged sanctions. Dennis Halliday, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq resigned in
1998 after a 34-year career with the UN, said that the sanctions amounted to genocide of the
Iraqi people.20 Hans von Sponeck, another long-term UN official who took over for Halliday,
resigned in 2000 along with Jutta Burghardt, head of the UN World Food Programme, over the
sanctions. Von Sponeck has since published a book detailing his experiences coordinating
sanctions and the Oil-for-Food Program (OFF). He takes issue with the UN’s human rights
reporting on Iraq during the sanctions era, particularly the reporting of Max van der Stoel, stating
that these reports routinely emphasized the right to food and health as critical areas of human
rights failures in Iraq, but placed the blame for failing to meet these needs entirely on the Iraqi
government.21 Von Sponeck believed that a critical and recurring failure in UN reporting was its
inability to see its own sanctions regime as a factor in Iraqi human rights conditions.
The failure of the UN to address the human rights consequences of sanctions, despite
widespread critique, was also clear with regard to women’s rights. That sanctions had a
disproportionate effect on women was understood; the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action at the World Conference on Women lists as an action to be taken by governments,
international, and regional organizations in paragraph 145 (i): “Take measures in accordance
with international law with a view to alleviating the negative impact of economic sanctions on
women and children.”22 Both the 1994 and 1998 Periodic Reports from Iraq on the Convention
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on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) strongly
emphasize the sanctions as the primary barrier to improving women’s status and rights.23
It is in this context that we now turn to the specific experiences of Iraqi women under
sanctions. It is important to understand the structural flaws of the sanctions and the OFF
program, as well as the failures of the UN to take responsibility for worsening human rights
situations, as we discuss the daily realities of Iraqi women. The program of sanctions, violently
and unjustly conceptualized without considering the violence that would be inflicted on Iraqi
bodies, also inflicted gender-specific forms of violence on Iraqi women.

Women and Work
It is impossible to understand the impacts of sanctions on the lives of Iraqi women
without also understanding the conditions created by the Iran-Iraq war and the 1990 Gulf War,
which further exacerbated the damage. The 8-year Iran-Iraq war ended a mere two years prior to
the start of sanctions, and the shifts in Iraq’s economic, family structures, and gender relations
clearly carried over into the sanctions period. The Gulf War at the opening of the sanctions era
caused direct damage to the population and infrastructure of Iraq that also continued to impact
the country during sanctions. It may never be possible to fully disentangle these catastrophic
events from each other, nor any of them from the effects of the 2003 invasion. The sanctions
regime sometimes doubled down on bad existing conditions for women during the previous
decade, and sometimes initiated a shift away from the realities of wartime.
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The Iran-Iraq war contributed to a rise of women in the workplace simply because so
much of the male population of Iraq was either conscripted or volunteered to fight in the war.
Women increasingly became the primary breadwinners as their male relatives fought and died in
the war. The state simultaneously lauded women as workers keeping the nation afloat and as
mothers of the new nation, emphasizing the importance of childbirth in the face of massive
population losses.24 These dual expectations often conflicted for women, who bore many burdens
of keeping the nation together during wartime.
The sanctions era opened in a context where men were returning from war in search of
work and women were increasingly encouraged to turn to motherhood as their national role. As
sanctions began to take effect and further harm the Iraqi economy, women were increasingly
discouraged from working. While there were few jobs available for anyone, those jobs that did
arise were more likely to be taken by men. Men without work often found jobs peddling food or
driving taxis, jobs typically considered unacceptable for women.25 The pressure for women to
leave work occurred both through changing social dynamics and through the elimination of
government programs that had allowed women to work in the public sphere. Socially, the role of
women became “umm bait muhtarama, the respectable housewife;” this represents a sharp
change from the rhetoric of the 1970s and 80s celebrating women workers. In 1975 Saddam gave
a speech condemning the “bourgeois ideology which assumes that the first and last role of
women is in the home.”26
On a national level, women were encouraged to resign or retire early and resignation was
incentivized by the termination of government programs providing free childcare and public
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transportation. Women had been the primary recipients of the welfare state more broadly, and so
were most affected by its collapse under sanctions.27 Iraq’s 1998 report to the UN on the
Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) discussed the
impacts of sanctions on women’s work participation. The report states that “the difficult
economic conditions created by the comprehensive embargo have also forced large numbers of
Iraqi women to… devote themselves to domestic work.” This shifts the blame onto the sanctions,
but ignores that the regime was actively promoting the domestic role of women and removing
social programs to encourage women’s work. In reference to childcare for women workers,
which had previously been free, the report notes that the number of facilities actually increased
from 1987-1996, but ignores that the programs for subsidized childcare had ended under
sanctions. 28 With the collapse of the welfare state, along with an erosion of extended family and
neighborhood networks, women were increasingly required to care for their own children and
thus were unable to work in the public sphere. The sanctions reduced economic opportunities for
everyone, but the state and society worked to shift the loss of work onto women so as to preserve
the opportunities for men, particularly by reducing state support for women workers.

Women’s Political Participation and the General Federation of Iraqi Women
One specific example of the declining income opportunities for women was the
stratification of the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) under sanctions. The GFIW was
essentially the women’s branch of the Ba‘th party and was controlled and funded by the state.
This group was a key space for women’s political participation towards the goal of promoting
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women’s equality. It is critical to note that women’s political participation, like that of all Iraqi
citizens, was severely limited throughout the Ba‘th era because Iraq was a one-party state.
Information on the political participation of women outside the Ba‘th party is therefore limited
because these groups were forced to hide their operations from the regime. However, the role of
women in the Ba‘th party was a key point of Ba‘thi rhetoric, and the GFIW was the key state
mechanism for mobilizing women.
The experience of women in GFIW represents only a small section of Iraqi women, as it
was only open to Ba‘thi women, but it did serve as a critical source of income for many women
prior to sanctions. Some members were able to use the funds allocated by the state to mobilize
Iraqi women and change their lives, and the GFIW was often in tension with Ba‘thi leadership,
pushing them on issues of women’s equality.29 However, after sanctions, the conditions changed
dramatically. One employee, Soha, told Al-Jawaheri that her salary was $320 USD per month
prior to sanctions. However, during sanctions, her salary dropped to $3.50 USD; she said, “‘now’
there are a few women who gain from being employees here, while the rest get nothing.”30 She
also describes how high ranking GFIW women received millions of Iraqi Dinars as well as
“valuable gifts from the delegations.” These gifts were typically humanitarian aid, intended for
the population, but stolen and distributed to friends of the regime, according a GFIW
informant.31 Meanwhile, women like Soha, who had previously held a relatively privileged
position as party members, were forced to take up informal work for secondary sources of
income. The 1998 CEDAW report, speaking of women’s political participation, claimed that
“any diminution in the role of women is due to the embargo and to their preoccupation with
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shouldering the burdens of the household.”32 This claim is clearly inaccurate considering that
certain GFIW women were able to materially benefit from sanctions. The GFIW saw not a
unilateral loss of benefits, but rather an increased stratification between the top-ranking members
and the larger base of employees. These leading members of the GFIW were, as Al-Ali puts it
“themselves part of oppressive political and social structures.”33 The women who had used the
GFIW to mobilize for legitimate social change were severely disadvantaged under sanctions,
while women who facilitated the continuation of oppressive class, gender, ethnic, and political
structures benefitted materially. This stratification had negative implications both for the
continued political participation of women and for their income.
The GFIW can be partially understood as an effort of “state feminism,” a process by
which the state coopted feminist struggle in order to control its progress, while simultaneously
suppressing other, non-state sanctioned feminist activity. The stratification of wealth in the
GFIW reflected the broader issues with state control of funds and programs during sanctions;
Saddam and other leading party members gained vast personal wealth through criminal activities
such as smuggling.34 The GFIW thus served as a microcosm for understanding Iraq at large and
the implications of the one-party system during this time. Women lost avenues for social
mobilization as well as access to work and pay, along with the rest of the Iraqi population. This
example also illustrates the importance of adding a class and political analysis to the gendered
experience of sanctions. The shifts in the GFIW benefitted some women as much as they
disadvantaged others.
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Women’s Education
Iraqi women also experienced a decline in educational opportunities during sanctions.
Prior to sanctions, Iraq’s education system was very advanced; education was mandatory from
ages 6-12 for all children, and education was free at all levels. The regime also made major
efforts to make education accessible for people of all socioeconomic backgrounds. By 1990,
women’s education had increased rapidly; female enrollment in secondary school increased to
38.5%, and though young women came from families where most of their mothers were
illiterate, in higher education women were a majority of students. 35 Women’s education was a
key part of the state feminist rhetoric. In a 1971 speech, Saddam said “what a crime it would be
against the younger generation if women were deprived of their rights to freedom, education, and
full participation in… the community.”36 Improving women’s education rates also has serious
implications for women’s health, increased fertility, and reduced overall child mortality rates, so
the state project also served a public health purpose.37 However, a study of women in Iraq
conducted prior to sanctions and published in 1990 suggests that, socially, education for women
was still perceived as a way to improve one’s status for marriage.38 Though the improvement of
women’s education existed within a social context that still limited women’s full participation,
its rise in the decades prior to sanctions can still be seen in relatively positive terms; women
(especially working class women) had greater access to resources that had previously posed a
barrier to education. While the social context remained limiting for women’s full pursuit of
educational goals, class barriers to education were at least minimized.
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However, under sanctions, female education declined sharply, and the class and public
health improvements were effectively eliminated. By 2000, illiteracy rates among Iraqi women
were at 71% for females age 15-24. Though primary education remained mandatory, statistics
show that over 1.5 million Iraqi girls eligible for primary school were not enrolled in the 20002001 school year. Female enrollment in secondary school dropped to 29%, lower than it had
been in the 1970s.39 Though strides had been made to eliminate socioeconomic barriers to
education in previous decades, much of this was reversed under sanctions. And although
education remained technically free, certain school supplies were no longer covered and many
families were unable to pay.40 Additionally, many young women were expected to make money
for their families in the informal economy (often through begging or theft) and did not have time
or funds to attend school.41 Those that were able to attend school experienced increasingly
unmaintained school facilities and increasingly underpaid teachers. The Iraqi blogger Riverbend
wrote that science classes in the universities suffered because their materials were banned under
the sanctions, and many textbooks were impossible to get as well.42 Whatever efforts had been
made to make education accessible to all genders and classes were effectively reversed under
sanctions.
The effects of this educational decline were crucially not limited to the scope of
education. The loss of subsidized educational resources had serious implications for both class
stratification and public health. Working class women and girls were kept out of education by the
reconstruction of financial barriers. With regards to public health, studies have shown that in
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Southwest Asia and North Africa, education is a critical factor for improving women’s planning
for childbirth and raising the age of marriage and first childbirth. Under sanctions in Iraq,
fertility rates rose to 5.4 births per the average woman by 2003, which is nearly the global high,
while child mortality and morbidity simultaneously rose to the highest regional rate.43 The
collapse of women’s education cannot be disentangled from the public health crisis under
sanctions, nor from the lasting psychological and physical trauma experienced by so many
women who gave birth while experiencing malnutrition, anemia, or other health crises, many of
whom subsequently lost their children. The violence of sanctions extends beyond the failure to
take responsibility for human rights crises; it lies also in the inability to connect the wide range
of human rights impacts. When we discuss the violence of the public health crisis, we cannot
separate this from the crisis of women’s education and work, the re-emphasis of women’s role as
mothers, and the long-term psychological impacts.

Family and Marriage
Nuclearizing Family Structures
The family structure of Iraqi society and the role of women in the family were affected
not only by declining employment and educational opportunities, but also by the medical impacts
of sanctions, including the deaths of children. By 1996, it was estimated that sanctions had killed
over half a million Iraqi children, a death toll that UN representative Madeleine Albright
infamously said was “worth it.”44 More recently, some studies have called into question the
extent of child mortality and proposed that child death estimates were inflated by the regime.45
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However, several studies, using more conservative estimates, have still found remarkably high
child mortality rates. Under-5 mortality in south and central Iraq were found to have increased
from 56 per 1000 births in 1984-1989 to 131 per 1000 births in 1994-1999. In Kurdistan, under-5
mortality actually decreased from 80 to 72 per 1000 births in the same period.46 Case studies of
Iraqi women show that the fear of child death had strong social impacts on Iraqi women and the
family experience. The impacts of these deaths on Iraqi families was particularly pronounced for
lower class families, who were more likely to experience child mortality.47 Women’s family role
began to change significantly even prior to the imposition of international sanctions, during the
Iran-Iraq war when the government outlawed contraceptives and emphasized the role of women
in reproducing the Iraqi population to compensate for the massive death toll of the war. This ban
on family planning continued into the sanctions period, but while women were still encouraged
to have many children, there was a greater reluctance to have children for fear that children
would die or that they would be unable to feed them. Additionally, the mass casualties of Iraqi
men during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, as well as rising economic migration of men, created a
large number of female-headed households, in Basra as high as 60%.48 As women were being
encouraged to have more children, they were also increasingly the sole providers for these
children in an economy where they were discouraged from working.
One such woman was Halimah, a 20 year old war widow and mother interviewed by AlJawaheri, whose case shows the collapse of kinship and neighborhood networks as a mechanism
for survival. Under sanctions, families shifted away from broader kinship networks and towards
the importance of the nuclear family.49 Here it is important to address that, though the nuclear
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family holds a particular importance in Western modernization, it should not be viewed as such
in the Iraqi context. Indeed, in Iraq, the shift away from extended networks may have led to more
oppressive patriarchal relations. In Halimah’s case, her neighborhood network of support no
longer existed because everyone had become extremely poor under sanctions. “We feel we have
been abandoned and that nobody can help us. We know we are forgotten.”50 Halimah’s desperate
condition forced her to turn to her brother and brother-in-law for support, but both were highly
aggressive towards her and attempted to control her and her daughter. Yasmin Al-Jawaheri
argues that women who lacked support from both the state and a broad family network under
sanctions were further subordinated because they developed “high dependency ratio on a single
male provider.”51 Halimah’s case is one example of how the deterioration of broad family
networks created more oppressive family relations for women.

Marriage as Survival
Given the importance of support from a male provider for many women, marriage
became increasingly important for young Iraqi women under sanctions, at the same time as it
became harder to find a husband due to the gender imbalance in Iraq following the Iran-Iraq war.
Hamdiya, a woman interviewed by Al-Ali, stated that, whereas it had once been considered
taboo to not get married or to enter a polygamous marriage, “among my generation, there are
many women who either did not get married… or became the second wife of someone.”52 She
also noted that many women married older expatriates. Polygamous marriages, which had been
sharply reduced and condemned by the regime in previous eras, were revived in the 1990s. In a
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1976 address to the General Federation of Iraqi Women, Saddam had stated the importance of
“strengthening and expanding the conditions which prohibit polygamy.”53 And yet under
sanctions, polygamous marriages increased dramatically, largely out of economic necessity.54
The desirability of a husband was no longer based on love and family reputation, but
instead based almost entirely on whether he could provide for his wife. As such, class dynamics
of marriage also shifted. Increasingly, middle-class women from important families who had
suffered under sanctions came to marry nouveau riche sanctions profiteers, primarily Oil-forFood contractors and oil smugglers, despite the fact that marriage below one’s family status had
previously been very uncommon.55 This indicates that money came to surpass family name in
determining social status. However, the limited number of husbands who could provide
economic protection also meant that many lower-class women were either not able to marry as
middle class women were or were not able to use marriage as a source of economic protection.
Whereas middle- and upper-class women focused heavily on marriage as a source of survival,
and thus were often forced into harmful or difficult marriages, lower class women were more
likely to experience very direct forms of gender-based violence through “honor” crimes or were
forced into sex work for survival. Changing marriage expectations should be understood as a
highly class-specific gender impact of sanctions.

Violence Against Women
“Honor” Killings and Domestic Violence
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“Honor” killing describes a particular circumstance; that is, the murder of women,
typically by family members, as a reaction to the perception that the woman has “dishonored”
the family. 56 The acts that are considered “dishonorable” are rooted in restrictive
heteropatriarchal social boundaries for women. Under sanctions, Iraq saw a revival of “honor”
killings and domestic violence; economic crisis and war have both been well documented as key
contributors to gender-based violence. The revival of “honor” killings in Iraq occurred not only
on a popular level under sanctions but was also encouraged by the state effectively legalizing
“honor” crimes. In 1990, Saddam issued a decree granting immunity to men accused of
committing “honor” crimes (i.e. crimes against women suspected of having violated codes of
social conduct.)57 Though this ruling was appealed two months later, this law granted legitimacy
to “honor” crimes beyond the scope of its existence, as the UN tracked an increase in “honor”
crimes during the 1990s compared to previous decades; approximately 4,000 women and girls
were murdered between 1990 and 2002 in so-called “honor” killings. It is unclear why this law
was passed, though Al-Jawaheri and Al-Ali both suggest that it was a tactic to gain the support of
conservative tribal and religious leaders in preparation for the invasion of Kuwait.58 The desire
by the regime to acquire the loyalty of tribal leaders continued during the sanctions period, and
men who killed female relatives for the purpose of preserving family “honor” were regularly
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acquitted.59 The legal system clearly came to increasingly favor those who committed “honor”
crimes rather than the victims of these crimes.
The rise in “honor” crimes contributed to real fears and changes in social dynamics for
young girls. Fifteen year old Zeinab described the changes women had to make in daily life to
prevent social criticism that could potentially damage a family’s “honor,” including increasingly
conservative dress; “Most people are somewhat pressured to change their lives in order to protect
themselves from… talk about family honour.”60
Domestic violence, too, was increasingly a product of economic insecurities. Both men
and women encouraged and perpetrated this violence against other women; al-Jawaheri
interviewed one woman, 20 year old Fatima, who was physically abused by her husband when
she fought back against his plan to take a second, older, wife from a wealthy family in order to
improve his economic position. Fatima’s mother in law encouraged the abuse and also took
control over her children. In her interview, Fatima said “My children are not mine. They are
hers.”61 Though al-Jawaheri notes that it is very difficult to understand the extent of domestic
violence in Iraq because it is not openly discussed, she believes that relationships like Fatima’s
with her mother-in-law were increasingly common during sanctions, as older women sought a
“stake in the system of domination” while opportunity for the family’s economic stability
diminished.62Violence against women was not merely a result of the economic stress of men, but
of the broader stresses placed on the entire community.
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Violence Against Sex Workers
Related to the rise in “honor” crimes and domestic violence was the increased violence
against those engaging in sex work. This coincided with a rise in sex work given the limited
opportunities for women to make money under sanctions. Iraq saw, for the first time, the
development of luxury brothels, the patrons of which were primarily sanctions profiteers and
members of the regime. Sex work quickly became a critical source of income to many women. 63
Given its complicity in the sex work sector, the regime initially supported, or at least failed to
interfere in the rising industry. However, beginning in 2000, the regime reportedly beheaded
more than 300 people accused of engaging in or facilitating sex work. One such incident
occurred in November 2000 when two sex workers in Baghdad were beheaded in front of their
homes. This public murder occurred in the morning and was witnessed by several neighbors,
including children who were on their way to school. Those living nearby said that the entire area
was left in a “shocked state.”64 It was well known that the clients of these women had been highranking government officials. To the populace witnessing these acts of violence, the general
perception was that it was an attempt on the part of the state to reassert its control over women
and the social order. There is also a general consensus among scholars that this attack on sex
workers, like the legalization of “honor” crimes, was an effort by the regime to gain the favor of
tribal and religious leaders in a period of increased social conservatism under sanctions. 65 The
sanctions contributed to both a rise in sex work as a means of economic survival and a rise in
social conservatism which punished women, violently, for these particular acts of survival. This
form of violence, committed by the state against women whose “crimes” depended on the
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participation of state actors, is merely evidence of the blatant double standard in morality for a
patriarchal state structure. Regardless of the state’s efforts to promote women’s liberation and
equal rights in previous decades, the intensity of the violence committed on women’s bodies by
state actors during sanctions shows that the state was interested primarily in maintaining its
control on women.

Violence Against Women in Iraqi Kurdistan
Kurdish women experienced the violence of sanctions differently because of their
position in a targeted ethnic minority as well as their gender. Kurdish women are certainly not
the only ethnic minority to face ethnic and gender violence under sanctions, and in fact because
of their geographic separation and autonomy from Central and Southern Iraq, are not necessarily
representative of the experiences of other ethnic minority women, on whom there is
unfortunately little data or study. It should also be noted that many non-Kurdish ethno-religious
minorities, including Yezidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Christians, and Turcomans, often identified
themselves as Kurdish when no other option was presented and many resided in the northern
regions designated as Kurdistan.66 Ethnic minority women, like poor women, faced particularly
difficult conditions under sanctions.
Certain specificities of the sanctions era in Iraqi Kurdistan should be noted. Iraqi
Kurdistan, located in the North, had been a target of state violence as an ethnic minority region.
The UN did not view Kurdistan as the primary target of sanctions, especially given that the
Kurdish population had been the targets of chemical attacks, and some UN aid programs
attempted to mitigate the effects of sanctions on Kurdistan, but Kurdistan was not exempt from
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sanctions. The sanctions era in Kurdistan has been described as “double embargo” because of the
impacts of both international sanctions and the Iraqi central government’s economic targeting of
the region, including power blackouts and currency manipulation which forced Kurdistan to
abandon the Iraqi dinar.67 This is consistent with the conclusions of Lv and Xu that economic
sanctions increase ethnic violence, in this case the violence being economic neglect.68 However,
Kurdistan also experienced a much higher rate of international aid than the rest of Iraq, as well as
a cash component to the OFF program not granted to the Central and South regions.69 In part
this aid was related to the international perception of the Kurdish population as victims of the
regime after the chemical attacks during the Anfal campaign genocide, though the same effort at
protecting victims of the regime did not seem to apply to other ethnic minorities, marginalized
populations, or, for that matter, most of the civilians who suffered under sanctions while the
regime escaped virtually unscathed. In addition to large amounts of aid, the de facto
establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 1992 allowed some regional
autonomy, though Kurdish autonomy was not recognized by the Iraqi state until Saddam was
overthrown in 2003. Furthermore, Kurdish autonomy has done little to foster Kurdish women’s
liberation.
The particularities of the sanctions era in Iraqi Kurdistan included a marked rise in
“honor” killings, beyond that of Iraq at large. Although Kurdish women had long been central in
the Kurdish independence struggle, the growth of aid allowed them to participate in large
numbers in the emerging civil society, strengthening women’s political organizing around issues
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of gender and violence. However, these women’s rights groups depend on the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) for their continued
existence.70 This helps explain why the presence of humanitarian groups and the rise in women’s
organizations has actually corresponded with a rise in “honor” killings and domestic violence in
the so-called “safe haven.” The KRG has made little headway in terms of improving the position
of Kurdish women and has often actively worked against this goal. Zouzan, a Kurdish activist
fighting against “honor” killings in the 1990s stated that “both political parties, the PUK and the
KDP, gave us a hard time. They really harassed us.”71 Zouzan ultimately exiled herself and
continued her activism from abroad because of this harrassment. In relation to “honor” killings,
the specific language of “honor” was removed from Kurdish law in 2002, but Kurdish women’s
rights activists still report that these crimes go largely unpunished.72 As Saddam’s legalization of
“honor” crimes was an attempt to consolidate support from conservative tribal leaders, so can the
KRG’s failure to prosecute murderers for “honor” be seen as an attempt to consolidate power in
a newly formed autonomous parastate. Additionally, after violent conflicts between the KDP and
PUK in 1994, efforts to consolidate tribal support increased even further.73
Because Kurdistan operated under a semi-autonomous legal structure, the development of
legal rights for women is different than in the rest of Iraq, but the sanctions period disadvantaged
women in this region as well. Indeed, following the creation of the KRG and establishment of
Kurdistan as a “safe haven,” Kurdish women saw an increase in instances of domestic violence.74
Kurdistan also experienced high rates of female headed households, exacerbated by the ethnic

70

The KDP and PUK were the two dominant political parties in the KRG and, until 2003, were strongly
oppositional and fought each other for maximal control
71
Al-Ali, Iraqi Women, 207.
72
Nadje al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, “Conspiracy of Near Silence: Violence Against Iraqi Women,” Middle
East Report, no. 258 (2011): 36.
73
Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, 218.
74
Al-Ali, Iraqi Women, 207.

30
violence it has suffered and the disappearances of Kurdish men; some relief workers estimated
between 3000 and 3500 female heads of household, or “Anfal widows,” in the Barzan valley
alone.75 Many women who lived through Anfal had also been raped, and over 700 girls were
kidnapped and sold to neighboring countries as a part of the violence; the Anfal widows suffered
compound traumas to their bodies and their families, as well as social ostracization for losing
their “honor” as survivors of rape.76 The struggles of these widows were perhaps somewhat
mediated by the large concentration of relief workers, many of them focusing on supporting
female headed households. Still, as with honor killings, widespread aid did not seem to correlate
with widespread relief of women’s problems. As late as 2007, 83% of these women had housing
problems.77

Final Considerations on Violence Against Women
The various types of gender-based violence described above are by no means a
comprehensive picture of the many forms of violence experienced by Iraqi women at alarming
rates during the sanctions era. Iraq also experienced a rise in street violence, including robbing,
rape, kidnapping, and murder, ofted targetting women. Women and girls sometimes disappeared
from in front of their own homes, and women who could afford to took taxis to and from home
for fear of leaving their home, even within their own neighborhoods.78 Essentially, sanctions
created widespread social chaos that produced lasting psychological damage for the entire
population of Iraq. Batuol, an Iraqi social scientist interviewed by Al-Jawaheri, described this
well: “It’s hardly surprising that economic deprivation and impoverishment have caused such
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wide-scale social distortion. The Iraqi society today is a masterpiece produced by the United
Nations sanctions… It’s true that the whole society is suffering, but it is women who are the
prime victims.”79
In tracing gender-based violence, it is further important to highlight the differential
impacts of violence based on women’s class status. Al-Ali writes that “for educated, middleclass women from urban areas, it was not so much honour crimes they feared as diminished
marriage prospects.”80 It should be noted that violence against sex workers and women accused
of violating “honor” codes impacted working-class women far more than middle or upper class
women, in part because these women were more likely to be driven to sex work as a means of
survival. Additionally, marriage was increasingly a means of economic and social protection, but
it was deeply based in class dynamics and many middle-class women struggled to find husbands,
making the marriage prospects for lower-class women even smaller. Violence against women in
the name of social conservatism most often impacted working-class women, who were also the
greatest victims of sanctions more broadly.
It is worth remembering that while “honor” killings and other gender based violence
increased during the sanctions period, they increased even further after the 2003 invasion. In the
sanctions period, the Iraqi government took a permissive attitude towards these crimes in order
to maintain loyalty ties with tribal and religious leaders. In the post-invasion period, the
increased sectarianization of rule under the U.S. occupation and the weakening of the central
government left tribal and religious leaders with greater control, further contributing to violence
against women.
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Conclusions: Beyond Sanctions and the Revolutionary Present
It is difficult to know how to conclude this essay given that the conditions for Iraqis in
general, and Iraqi women in particular, have only worsened since the end of sanctions. The
fragmentation of the country by ISIS and control of other foreign states, the endless U.S.
occupation following the bloody 2003 invasion, the sanctions era, the Gulf War, the 8-year IranIraq war, and the brutal policies of the Ba‘th party mean that Iraq has experienced at least 40
years of continual violence and destruction with little chance to recover. The violence on Iraq,
and the further marginalization of Iraqi women because of this violence, is ongoing. This essay
focuses on a specific set of policies and a specific population, women, to explore only some of
the many ways that violence has manifested in Iraq. This focus deconstructs a particular
narrative about the sanctions on Iraq, namely that they were a nonviolent alternative to war, and
that the regime, rather than the UN or U.S., was solely responsible for human rights abuses. The
scope of this essay also fits into a broader, emerging conversation about the violence of sanctions
as international policy more generally, and the particular populations that experience targeted
violence under economic sanctions.
My goal is not to suggest that Iraqi men have not also suffered under sanctions or in the
decades since. Iraqi men have also experienced economic and physical violence, and for certain
populations of men, such as ethnic minority or lower-class men, the impacts of sanctions and war
may have been greater than for certain Iraqi women. But the gender focus of this paper has led to
the conclusion that sanctions indeed have a variety of gender-specific, negative impacts. A
policy cannot claim to be nonviolent if a consistent and severe “side effect” of that policy is an
increase in violence against the target state’s most marginalized populations, including, among
others, gender, ethnic, and class minority groups. If the United Nations and the international
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community are genuinely interested in preventing human rights violations and ending all
discrimination against women, it is no longer viable for them to continue to enact and enforce
economic sanctions as they have historically been implemented.
I would also like to turn, beyond the scope of this paper, to the present, in order to
understand not only the lasting effects of sanctions and war on Iraq and situate the current
revolution in Iraq in relation to the ongoing impacts of sanctions on the region.
Iraq remains devastated by ongoing violence and foreign control of a fragmented state.
But it is also clear that, despite the present lived reality in Iraq, many revolutionaries trace the
conditions in Iraq back to the sanctions era. Reports show that 58.43% of the population of Iraq
is under the age of 24, and 39.01% are under age 15.81 For these young people, their only reality
has been life under imperial control. Some of them were born into sanctions, but most were born
into the post-sanctions, post-invasion destruction of Iraq. It is no wonder that Iraqis of all ages
are currently taking to the streets to fight for their rights to live; the most chilling element of
these protests is their primary slogan: Nureed Watan - We Want a Country.82 A further
characteristic of this revolution is the participation of young women and girls, whose
participation is truly powerful considering that, through sanctions and occupation, Iraq has
become increasingly socially conservative and opposed to women’s political participation. In
addition to facing the violent reaction of the state, women revolutionaries have faced threats and
disapproval from families, and several female activists have been abducted or killed for their
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participation in the revolution.83 And yet these women continue to show up for national
liberation; they too want a country. Their participation in the revolution is also related to their
oppression as women; women emphasized the poor conditions of their education and the
ostracization of women in political movements as key motivators for their participation,
alongside their national goals.84 This is understandable when we take time to examine the
historical intersection of imperial policy and violence against women during sanctions. The
revolution that began on October 25, 2019 (sometimes called the October Revolution) is an
inspiring example of a people attempting to heal their country, and the power of the women
revolutionaries in particular is a direct challenge to the gendered violence of international policy.
Among other focuses of the Iraq Revolution is the need to fight back against Iranian
interference in Iraqi governance, which flourished after the 2003 invasion. Iran is currently the
target of U.S. sanctions and, though these sanctions are not directly comparable to those enforced
on Iraq, they have had ongoing violent impacts on Iranians. The sanctions on Iran have also
continued to harm Iraq; because of Iran’s influence on Iraq, and particularly Iraq’s economic
importance to Iran, some have posited that the intensification of sanctions by the U.S. has caused
the Iranian government to crack down more violently on protests in Iraq.85
It is impossible to separate these ongoing histories from the international sanctions
policies that have targeted these states and contributed to the further economic marginalization of
already marginalized populations. The people of Iraq, Iran, and many other countries in the
Global South are risking their lives to revolt against the conditions that sanctions have helped
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create. For those of us in the Global North, the very least we can do is follow their lead and
revolutionize international relations. If, as Georgis and Gewarges suggest, we can center the
people experiencing bodily harm as a direct result of these policies in formulating international
policies, we might begin to approach an alternative to the senseless violence that comes from
treating human suffering as unintended consequences.
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